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The FY 1996 federal budget process has been distinguished by a 
series of unprecedented "firsts."    The 104th Congress, the first 
Republican-led Congress in over 40 years, promised to produce a federal 
budget for FY 1996 that would incorporate significant changes in fiscal 
policy.    Congress intended to balance the budget and eliminate the deficit 
by 2002, and proposed substantial cuts in entitlement spending in order to 
accomplish this.    Additionally, Congress intended to cut taxes and 
increase funding for defense.      Although the majority party believed that 
balancing the budget was possible, most students of the federal budget 
process considered it improbable given the competing objectives and 
political sensitivities surrounding the methods proposed to achieve this 
goal.   This thesis describes how Congress attempted to achieve its 
objectives, and evaluates the impact of such an unprecedented economic 
plan on specific elements of the federal budget.   Congress did pass a 
budget resolution, reconciliation package, and several appropriation bills 
that reflected a zero deficit by 2002.    However, two Continuing 
Resolutions were required as Congress and the President continued 
negotiations after reaching an impasse on the FY 1996 federal budget. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
The 1995 federal budget process has been highlighted by a 
series of unprecedented "firsts," and continues to make front page 
headlines as the 104th Congress attempts to achieve a series of 
fiscally ambitious goals.   This budget is the first to be developed by 
a Republican-led Congress in over 40 years [Ref. 1], and the majority 
leadership has been unequivocal in its demand for sweeping change 
in both fiscal and military policy. 
Topping the leadership's priority list is the balancing of the 
federal budget and the elimination of the deficit by the year 2002. 
[Ref. 2]     Although the majority party believes that balancing the 
budget within the next seven years is possible, many students of the 
federal budget process consider it improbable given the competing 
objectives and political sensitivities surrounding the  methods 
proposed to achieve this goal. [Ref. 3]    The task is even more 
difficult given the  majority's  additional  objectives  of  increasing 
defense spending and cutting taxes.   The Republican leadership has 
targeted the rate of growth of entitlement spending for reduction as 
one of the primary means to finance these initiatives and balance 
the budget.    Although Congress remains wary of tampering with 
Social Security benefits, it is determined to cut Medicare and 
Medicaid, the fastest growing of all entitlement spending. [Ref. 4] 
In addition to its demand for a balanced budget, the House 
majority included in its "Contract with America" an insistence on 
the "restoration" of military funding. [Ref. 5]     The authors of the 
"Contract" argued for this increase in DoD spending to improve the 
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readiness of military forces that had been reduced as a result of the 
combination of reduced defense spending and increased and 
unbudgeted spending on "non-traditional" programs such as 
peacekeeping operations. [Ref. 6] 
However, certain congressional budget estimates indicate that 
if the budget is to be balanced by 2002, cuts in defense over the next 
six years would have to total at least $110 billion.    This figure 
assumes that during this six year period income taxes would not be 
cut and entitlement spending would be reduced.     Conversely, if taxes 
were to be cut and entitlement spending allowed to grow at its 
current rate, $520 billion would need to be cut from the DoD budget 
in order to reach a balanced budget by 2002. [Ref. 7] 
These figures indicate that it will be very difficult for 
Congress to simultaneously eliminate the deficit, increase the 
defense budget and cut taxes.   By tracking the FY 1996 budget 
through the congressional budget resolution, authorization, 
appropriation,  and  reconciliation  processes, this thesis will 
describe how the 104th Congress attempts to resolve these 
differences, and will evaluate the effect and influence of the budget 
process on DoD funding levels ultimately recommended by Congress. 
The thesis is organized into three parts.   Part 1 provides the 
essential political background that distinguishes this year's budget 
debate from any of its predecessors.    Within this section, Chapters 
II and  III  review the politically significant issues influencing the 
1995 budget, including the balancing of the budget, reduction of 
entitlement spending, increasing military spending, and cutting 
taxes.   Chapter IV discusses the economic and budgetray 
implications of a balanced budget. 
Part 2 provides an analysis of the specific elements of the 
FY 1996 budget, with an examination of the contents and substance 
of the budget package as it progresses through the various 
congressional budget processes.   Chapter V compares the House and 
Senate budget resolutions, Chapter VI assesses the differences 
between the House and Senate Authorization and Appropriation 
legislation on defense spending, and Chapter VII evaluates 
reconciliation.    The final section (Chapter VIII)    provides an 
evaluation of the FY 1996 budget in terms of meeting the goals that 
the 104th Congress specified at the beginning of the budget process. 
This thesis is based primarily on information derived from 
hearings in the respective committees and subcommittees of the 
House of Representatives and the Senate, along with House and 
Senate bills, reports and final conference agreements comprising 
the FY 1996 budget.    Supplemental information supporting the 
research includes publications from the Congressional Budget 
Office, Congressional Research Service, and Office of Management 
and Budget publications, as well as DoD budget policy and planning 
documents and relevant professional periodicals and news briefs. 
This study serves as a comprehensive record of the 
development of the FY 1996 defense budget.   The thesis should be of 
particular significance and benefit to all faculty and students 
interested in public policy and budgeting, and to any Department of 
Defense   personnel involved with the DoD budget process. 

II.  THE FEDERAL DEFICIT AND ENTITLEMENT SPENDING 
Public opinion polls throughout the 1994 congressional 
election campaign indicated that the American electorate demanded 
above all else a solution to the "fiscal disorder" of the federal 
budget. [Ref. 8]     Not surprisingly, a majority of the victorious 
candidates centered their campaign platforms around the 
achievement of this goal.    Subsequently, since its first session in 
February 1995, the 104th Congress has proclaimed the elimination 
of the deficit and balancing of the federal budget by the year 2002 
to be its number one priority. 
The Republican leadership has favored cuts in both mandatory 
and discretionary spending, to include a reduction in the growth of 
Medicare and Medicaid entitlement programs, in order to finance the 
almost $1.2 trillion in spending reductions required to eliminate the 
deficit over seven years. [Ref. 9]     Although congressional Democrats 
acknowledge that deficit control is the central and most influential 
issue on Capitol Hill today, they offered no budget plan to eliminate 
the   deficit. 
The Democrat's reluctance to provide alternative solutions is 
rooted  in the traditionally  more  liberal principles of responsibility 
to social welfare, and subsequent adversity to reductions in 
entitlement programs.    With such strong reluctance to limit 
entitlement spending, and following eight years of deep budget cuts 
in the Department of Defense (DoD), the Democrats have been hard 
pressed to identify other programs to cut in order to balance the 
federal budget. 
A second, yet equally controversial issue of the 1994 election 
debate involved the role of U.S. armed forces in non-traditional 
"peacekeeping" operations.   The Republican leadership has argued 
that the Clinton administration has strained DoD financial and 
physical resources with its involvement in several United Nations- 
sponsored operations, such as   Rwanda, Bosnia, and Haiti.   They cite 
DoD's request for supplemental appropriations in 1994 and 1995, and 
highly publicized press reports of deficiencies in military readiness 
and training, as evidence of this military overextension.     As a 
solution, the majority party has demanded a reevaluation of the 
involvement of U.S. forces in U.N. activities, and has advocated an 
increase in military spending to prevent the development of an 
inadequately trained, equipped, and funded "hollow force." [Ref. 10] 
A third prevalent but less controversial issue of the 1994 
campaign involved income tax reductions.   Although both Democrats 
and Republicans favor reductions, the two parties differ regarding 
the size and identity of the recipients of the tax breaks.   The Clinton 
administration  supports tax  relief  primarily  benefiting  middle 
income families with children in college.      The Republicans, 
however, have advocated a more robust tax reduction package, and 
have recommended a wide variety of cuts in personal, small 
business, and corporate income taxes.    The majority party maintains 
that it can still balance the budget by 2002 because the levels of 
reduction in entitlement spending that it recommends would more 
than offset the decrease in federal revenues resulting from its 
proposed income tax reduction package. [Ref. 11] 
This chapter evaluates in more detail two of the four popular 
political issues that have impacted the FY 1996 budget debate more 
than any other - the federal deficit and entitlement spending.   The 
next chapter examines the two other influential issues,    DoD 
spending, and income tax reform, more closely.   The following 
discussion of the origins of the federal deficit, and an evaluation of 
some of its probable causes, will highlight the inextricable 
relationship between the current deficit and entitlement spending. 
Further analysis of the relationship between entitlements and DoD 
spending and federal revenues will demonstrate the significant and 
growing influence entitlement spending holds over all other 
components of federal budget. 
A. THE FEDERAL DEFICIT 
Deficits occur when the government spends more money in a 
year (outlays) than it receives in revenues.    To compensate for this 
overexpenditure, the government borrows money by selling 
securities to investors who earn interest.    The debt is the total 
amount of money the government owes to these investors, that is, 
the total amount of annual deficits the government has not repaid. 
When, for example, the government generated a deficit of $203 
billion in FY 1994, it added that much to the federal debt, which now 
totals about $3.6 trillion. [Ref.  12] 
Between 1789 and 1932, the federal budget was balanced the 
majority of the time, with deficits typically arising only as a result 
of the country's involvement in a major war.    Between 1932 and 
1995, however, the federal budget has been balanced only eight 
times, the last year being 1969.    [Ref. 13]     Since that time, neither 
major macroeconomic events (i.e., recessions) or geopolitical crises 
(i.e., major or minor wars) seem to have had a significant impact on 
the federal budget. 
Nevertheless, there has been recent limited success in 
controlling the growth of the deficit, resulting from a combination 
of spending cuts, tax increases, and a strong economy.   The deficit 
was reduced by nearly $100 billion to approximately $200 billion 
between 1992 ar,d 1994, and is expected to remain at that level 
through 1998.     However, the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) 
projects that between 1996 and 2005 the deficit will more than 
double to approximately $460 billion. The ratio of the deficit to the 
gross domestic product (GDP) is expected to climb from 2.6 percent 
to 4.0 percent during the same period. [Ref. 14, p. 19] 
The fact that there has been only modest improvement in the 
deficit in recent years, and that the level is expected to soon 
increase despite earnest attempts to prevent such an occurrence, 
suggests that the deficit is probably what Allen Schick describes as 
"structural," existing as a result of some inherent fault in the 
federal budget process. [Ref. 15]     Failing to recognize such 
deficiencies, however, Congress has unsuccessfully attempted to 
cope with the nagging deficit problem over the last twenty years 
through a series of federal budget policy and procedural changes. 
Provided below is a brief description of these attempts. 
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1. Congressional   Budget   Act   of   1974 
In 1974, the 93rd Congress passed the Congressional Budget 
Act.    This act established the formal budget process in effect today 
that allows Congress to coordinate its own spending and taxing 
decisions.    Specifically, the act created the Senate and House Budget 
Committees with the responsibility for developing budget 
resolutions.    To assist these committees and the rest of Congress, 
the act also established the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) to 
analyze economic conditions and budgetary alternatives. [Ref. 16] 
2. Balanced   Budget   and   Emergency   Deficit   Control   Act 
In 1985 the Budget Act was amended by the Balanced Budget 
and Emergency Deficit Control Act (popularly known as the Gramm- 
Rudman-Hollings Act).    This amendment provided for the elimination 
of the federal deficit over 5 years.    If spending during a year 
exceeded the annual target deficit by more than $10 Billion, an 
across-the-board cut (sequester) would be levied against all eligible 
spending accounts.      In 1987, the GRHA was revised to allow for the 
elimination of the deficit by 1993. [Ref. 16] 
3. Budget   Enforcement  Act 
The Budget Enforcement Act (BEA) was passed in 1990.   This 
act suspended the GRH sequestration policy, and instead of trying to 
eliminate the deficit, the BEA attempted to reduce it through a new 
policy of spending control.   The act established spending caps for 
defense, international, and domestic programs in order to reduce the 
deficit.   These separate caps applied through FY 1993, to be replaced 
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by a combined cap on all discretionary spending for FY 1994 and 
FY 1995, as stipulated in the BEA.   In 1994 Congress extended this 
combined cap through 1998. [Ref. 17] 
The  BEA allowed for "deficit neutral" or "pay-as-you-go" 
(PAYGO) policies for entitlement spending and taxation. 
Specifically, Congress could not authorize an increase in spending on 
a specific entitlement program, or create a new program, without 
offsetting that increase by an equal cut in another entitlement 
program or an equivalent increase in taxes.    Similarly, Congress 
could not legislate a reduction in certain income taxes without 
increasing taxes in another area. 
4.     The   Balanced   Budget  Amendment 
Devised in 1995 by the leadership of the 104th Congress, this 
amendment to the Constitution would have required the federal 
budget to be balanced by 2002 or seven years after enactment, 
whichever was later. [Ref. 5]   Despite strong support in the House, 
the amendment was narrowly defeated in the Senate.    The 104th 
Congress remains determined, however, to honor the objectives and 
spirit of the amendment by balancing the budget within seven years 
through the regular budget process. 
Schick describes these attempts by Congress to modify the 
federal  budgeting process as indicators of procedural deterioration 
of that process, resulting from the large and chronic deficits.    The 
deficits, he explains, are a consequence of the history of 
programmed growth in spending accompanied by sluggish economic 
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growth, and a combination of Congress's support for entitlements 
and resistance to taxes.    In an attempt to control deficit spending, 
Congress has in turn adopted a policy of improvisational, ad hoc 
budgeting. 
B. ENTITLEMENTS AND THE DEFICIT 
Entitlements are legal obligations created through  legislation 
that require the payment of benefits to any person or unit of 
government thai meets the eligibility requirements required by law. 
[Ref. 18].   The era of modern entitlements began in 1930's with 
President Roosevelt's "New Deal," which transformed the 
government's primary role in domestic affairs from tax collector to 
a stabilizer and redistributor of private income.    The first 
entitlement program, the Railroad Retirement, was passed in 1934. 
Since that time the number of entitlement programs has increased 
to over twenty [Table 1], with the largest three, Social Security, 
Medicare, and Grants to States with Medicaid, accounting for 
approximately 70 percent of all entitlement spending. 
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TABLE 1.  MAJOR   ENTITLEMENT PROGRAMS,  FY 1992 ($ in  thousands).     From  Ref.  19 
Program 1992     Outlays Cumulative   %   of   Total 
Entitlements 
1. Social Security 284,558,211 40.2 
2. Medicare 128,260,811 58.3 
3. Grants to states with Medicaid 68,254,000 67.9 
4. Civil Service retirement and disability fund 34,307,000 70.8 
5. Unemployment trust fund 32,763,975 77.8 
6. Military retirement fund 24,444000 80.8 
7. Food stamp program 22,442,702 84.0 
8. Supplemental security income i rugram 16,426,000 86.3 
9. Veteran's compensation and , msions 16,047,086 88.6 
10. Family support payments to States 14,968,000 90.7 
11. Commodity credit corporation 11,852,200 92.4 
12. Earned income tax credit 6,694,000 93.3 
13. State child nutrition payments 5,983,000 94.2 
14. Railroad retirement 4,070,600 94.8 
15. Government payment for annuities, 
employees health benefits 
3,685,000 95.3 
16. Guaranteed Student loans 3,566,900 95.8 
17. Social services block grant 2,800,000 96.2 
18. Payments to states for foster «are 2,563,000 96.5 
19. Rehabilitation services and disability 
research 
2,029,585 96.8 
20. Environmental conservation acreage 
reserve program 
1,797,915 97.1 
21. National service life insurance fund 1,323,350 97.3 
Twenty-one largest programs 688,807,335 97.3 




Between  1950-1970, entitlement spending grew faster than 
any other component of the federal budget.   By 1974, the year 
Congress adopted the Congressional Budget Act, mandatory spending 
actually exceeded discretionary spending. [Ref. 20]    Entitlement 
growth continued through the 1970's and 1980's.    In 1993 Social 
Security, the largest entitlement program, exceeded defense, the 
largest discretionary program, as the largest single spending 
program in the federal budget. [Ref. 20]    In 1995 entitlement 
spending accounted for 50 percent of total federal outlays, with the 
remaining spending distributed between DoD, at 19 percent, other 
discretionary at 17 percent, and interest on the debt at 15 percent. 
[Ref. 14] 
CBO anticipates that the two largest health care programs, 
Medicare and Medicaid, will continue to grow faster than the GDP, as 
they have since they were created in the mid-1960's.   Each program, 
in fact, is expected to grow more than nine per cent a year for the 
next five years-far faster than federal revenues.    Outlays for 
Medicare and Medicaid programs are expected to climb from 3.6 
percent of GDP in 1994 to 6.2 percent in 2004.   After 1998, when the 
caps on discretionary spending expire, the drop in discretionary 
spending (in relation to GDP) will no longer be enough to outweigh 
this steady rise in health care spending.    At this time CBO estimates 
the deficit will once again start to climb as a percentage of GDP. 
[Ref. 14] 
Entitlement spending's influence on the federal deficit has 
been acknowledged by most professional budget analysts, including 
Aaron Wildavsky, who believes budgeting and entitlement to be 
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"incompatible concepts," explaining that "entitlements,  when taken 
together, without a corresponding willingness to raise taxes, broke 
the back of classical budgeting". [Ref. 18, p. 260]     With entitlements 
growing twice as fast as the rest of the budget, and two-and-a-half 
times faster than the GDP, Congress's budgeting flexibility and 
fiscal responsibility have been severely limited. 
Wildavsky identifies the growth in the number of beneficiaries 
("uptake") and the policy of entitlement "indexing" (the tieing of the 
benefit payment to a measure of price change, such as the Consumer 
Price Index) as ihe primary causes of this entitlement growth. 1 
[Ref. 18, p. 260;   Other significant causes of growth include the 
increase in claims against Medicare and Medicaid, and the average 
growth of Social Security.    CBO estimates that 1996 entitlement 
spending will increase by approximately $56 billion [Table 2], with 
Medicare and Medicare accounting for the lion's share of the 
increase. 
11n 1988, about 30 percent of federal spending was indexed, as were 
nearly 90 percent of benefit payments received by individuals. [Ref. 18, p. 
277] 
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Table 2.    FY 1996 INCREASES IN ENTITLEMENT SPENDING.   After Ref. 9 
Increases Billions of current dollars 
Growth in caseloads 15 
COLA Assessment (Indexing) 10 
Medicaid and Medicare Increases 20 
Average Growth in Social Security 6 
Automatic increases in othfe  benefits 5 
Total $56 B 
The current budget process actually incorporates an explicit 
bias toward entitlement programs and against discretionary 
spending and is programmed for growth.   Most of the growth in 
federal spending that contributed to the rise of the deficit during 
the 1980's and early 1990's is accounted for by entitlement 
programs.    Doyle explains the significance of these developments, 
which are also illustrated in Table 3: 
The GBO expects entitlement spending to increase by 
96 percent during the decade of the 1990's, its share of 
total spending jumping from 48.1 percent to 59.7 percent. 
As a percent of GDP, entitlements will grow almost two 
points, from 11.2 to 13.1.    Discretionary spending, by 
contrast, will grow only 13.1 percent in this decade. 
Its share of total spending will fall sharply, from 40.2 
percent to 29.0 percent, and its share of the GDP will drop 
three full points, from 9.4 percent to 6.4.   Measured as a 
share of GDP, the drop in discretionary spending is greater 
than the increase in spending for entitlement programs. 
[Ref. 20, p. 17] 
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Table  3.  SPENDING 
outlays   in   bs'iions 
AND  TAXING  TRENDS,  1980-2000 













678.2 1323.8 95 2084 57 
% of GDP 22.9 23.3 21.6 
Entitle- 
ments 
3 40.6 634.2 86 1245 96 
As % of total 
spending 
50.2 48.1 59.7 
As % of GDP r>.5 11.2 13.1 
Discretion 
a ry 
308.2 534.8 74 605 13.1 
As % of total 
spending 
45.4 40.2 29.0 
As % of GDP 10.4 9.4 6.4 
Revenues 5 9 9.3 1054.3 76 1787 69.5 
As % of GDP 20.2 18.6 18.8 
Deficit 79.0 269.5 241 297 10.2 
As % of GDP 2.7 4.7 3.1 
1fi 
1.    Mispejceptions    About    Entitlements 
Wildavsky suggests that lawmakers have been hesitant to 
curtail  entitlement growth  for  "legitimate  policy  reasons...of 
efficiency,  or the  political difficulty of alternatives,  or the desire 
to keep promises that are made." [Ref. 18, p. 269]   Undoubtedly, 
politicians are hesitant to cut entitlements for fear of losing votes 
from their constituents during the next election.    But it is the need 
to change the public's many misperceptions about entitlements, 
particularly the oalief that Social Security and Medicare are an 
earned right ana owed to individuals following their years of 
contributions, that makes cutting the programs so politically 
unpalatable.    Pete Peterson explains the reality of the situation: 
Most currently retired Americans receive Social 
Security benefits that are two to five times greater 
than the actuarial value of prior contributions, by both 
employer and employee.   The payback for the Medicare 
Hospital Insurance program is five to twenty times 
greater.    A typical middle income couple who retired in 
1981  have already received back, with interest, not 
only the actuarial value of their previous Social Security 
and Medicare taxes but also the total value of their 
lifetime Federal income taxes.   [Ref. 3, p. 82] 
Another popular misconception that must be reversed if 
lawmakers are to overcome their apprehension of reducing 
mandatory spending is that most federal social spending goes to the 
poor or underprivileged.   This is not the case.   Although today's 
entitlements prevent some 20 million Americans (half of them 
elderly) from falling into poverty, only about one out or eight federal 
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dollars of social spending serves to lift poor families above the 
poverty line.    In 1991  nearly half of all entitlements went to 
households with incomes over $30,000.   One quarter went to 
households with incomes over $50,000. [Ref. 3, p. 82]     The public's 
lack of awareness of statistics like these has until recently 
inhibited the  politicians from  seriously  considering  substantial 
entitlement   reform. 
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III. DEFENSE SPENDING AND TAX REFORM 
This chapter evaluates the role of two additional issues 
influencing this year's budget debate, defense spending and tax cuts. 
Although the amounts of federal revenues and outlays associated 
with these issues are not nearly as significant (relative to GDP) as 
entitlements, they nonetheless play a substantive role in this year's 
federal budget process and debate. 
A. DEFENSE SPENDING 
The public's awareness of potential economic problems 
associated with the federal deficit became much more acute in the 
late 1980's, coincidently with the dissolution of the Soviet Union. 
Popular opinion at that time maintained that the U.S. armed forces 
need not be nearly as massive, in that the threat of war with the 
Soviet Union had crumbled with the Berlin Wall.   Some in Congress 
argued for larger cuts in defense spending as a result of these 
changes. 
1.      Recent   History 
Although in 1989 President Bush had demonstrated a 
willingness to subordinate defense spending requirements to a 
deficit reduction program, President Clinton put defense savings at 
the heart of his deficit reduction plan.   The Clinton economic 
recovery program included more than $700 billion in deficit 
reduction for fiscal years 1994-1998, but proposed new spending 
for economic stimulus and investment programs lowered the net 
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deficit reduction total to less than $500 billion.    Defense spending 
cuts and tax increases provided nearly three-fourths of this planned 
deficit reduction package. [Ref. 22, p. 100] 
Over the last several years DoD has absorbed the bulk of 
federal budget cuts that have been required to reduce the deficit. 
The defense budget has been reduced to its lowest level as a share 
of GDP and federal outlays since the military stand-down 
immediately following World War IK    Today many lawmakers 
consider DoD to be inadequately funded and unable to successfully 
fulfill the many unique responsibilities delegated to it by the 
President. 
2.      Peacekeeping   Operations 
The Clinton administration has further constrained defense 
spending with the involvement of military forces in several U.N.- 
sponsored peace-keeping activities, including the former Yugoslavia, 
Haiti, and Somalia.    In FY 1994, total DoD commitment of resources 
to peacekeeping operations was over $1.4 billion. [Ref. 23, p. 51] 
Although these "nontraditional" military operations have been 
unplanned by DoD, they have been financed in most cases with money 
appropriated to the fastest-spending (and most available) DoD 
accounts - Operations and Maintenance (O&M) and Personnel. [Ref. 23, 
p. 49]    The O&M accounts have been so constrained that on more than 
one occasion over the last two fiscal years, DoD has been forced to 
request supplemental appropriations from Congress in order to 
finance its daily operations. [Ref. 24] 
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3.      Othe*    "Nontraditional"   Defense   Spending 
The constraints on the DoD budget have been amplified in 
recent years by the growth in spending on additional "non- 
traditional" defense items.    Table 4 identifies these programs and 
their related expenses between 1990-1993.    During this time (a 
period of real cuts in the total defense budget), funding for several 
categories of such activities had grown,  particularly environmental 
cleanup programs.    The Clinton administration is determined to 
continue funding these programs, despite their continued significant 
cost growth.   Tha President plans to spend over $28 billion on 
"environmental activities" alone through the end of the decade. [Ref. 
25, p. 178] 
Using   DoD accounts to finance peacekeeping and other 
"nontraditional" activities and the subsequent requests by DoD for 
supplemental funds to maintain readiness has the new congressional 
leadership concerned about the military's operational effectiveness. 
The popular perception on Capitol Hill of the armed forces' lack of 
"readiness" and inadequate "training," and more recently of its 
potential slowdown in weapons modernization and procurement, has 
led many Republican leaders to believe that DoD is on the verge of 
another "hollow force," similar to the one in existence in the late 
1970's. 
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TABLE 4.  "NONTRADITIONAL"  DEFENSE SPENDING,  FISCAL 
YEARS   1990-1993   (In   billions   of   1995   dollars   of   budget 
authority).   After  Ref.   26 
1990 1991 1992 1993 
DoD Environmental Activities 1.6 2.8 4.0 5.3 
Defense Conversion and 
Dual-Use Technology 
.6 .7 1.2 2.9 
Drug Interdiction and 
Counterdrug Activities 
.5 1.2 1.3 1.2 
Former Soviet Union 
Threat Reduction 
0 0 .2 .4 
Humanitarian Assistance * * .2 .2 
Other Miscellaneous # .8 1.0 1.2 1.3 
Total 3.5 5.7 8.0 11.2 
* Less than $50 million. 
# This category includes a number of small programs that are financed primarily in the 
Operation and Maintenance Title, such as funding for the summer Olympics, World Cup Soccer, 
disaster relief, and a variety of museum projects. 
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4.     Look ng  Ahead 
In order to prevent this development, House Republicans of the 
104th Congress pledged in their "Contract with America" to provide 
for the "...restoration of the essential parts of our national security 
funding to strengthen our national defense and maintain our 
credibility around the world." [Ref. 10]   Although the authors of the 
contract provided no specifics about how such a "restoration" was 
to be financed, their apprehension of the military's involvement in 
"non-traditional"  missions,  and  of the  financing  for  "non-military" 
programs from CoD accounts, indicates some reduction in both 
activities as a possible starting point for savings. 
Despite tnese recent congressional promises, not all are 
optimistic about the possibility of increased defense funding in the 
near future.    Defense budget expert Dennis Ippolito estimates that 
DoD appropriation levels will remain low for the next several years 
due to the entitlement "spending dynamic."   He argues that with the 
expected continued high rates of growth for entitlements, especially 
Medicare and Medicaid, the relative size of discretionary spending 
will continue to decline.    Ippolito aptly summarizes: 
The spending constraints affecting defense, therefore, 
include the indirect effect of entitlement program growth, as 
well as the direct effect of competition with discretionary 
domestic needs.   Indeed, the fate of the defense budget seems 
inextricably linked to the future course of entitlement policy. 
[Ref. 22,   p. 112] 
Recent CBO reports support his argument.   CBO estimates that 
between FY 1990-FY 1999, the cumulative real growth in spending 
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for mandatory and domestic discretionary programs will be 38 
percent and 12 percent respectively, while defense outlays will 
decrease by 35 percent. [Ref. 27] 
B. TAX CUTS 
Both Democrats and Republicans acknowledge that the incomes 
of many middle-class Americans have remained stagnant or have 
even declined in the last 15 years, despite the relative growth in the 
economy.    Frorr  1980-1993, real incomes of the middle one-fifth of 
households rose by less than 1 percent, an average of under $200 
each. [Ref. 28]   in order to ease the burden on the lower-middle- 
class American families, the Clinton administration sponsored and 
Congress approved an increase in the amount of the Earned Income 
Tax Credit (EITC) in 1993. 
1.   Clinton   Administration   Tax   Cut   Proposals 
Inspired by the recent reductions in the deficit, President 
Clinton has proposed an expanded package of tax cuts for the middle 
class in FY 1996.   The package includes a number of provisions, 
including a $500 per child tax credit for middle-income families 
with children  under 13, expanded eligibility for Individual 
Retirement Accounts, and a tax deduction for the costs of college, 
university, or vocational education.    The President proposes to 
finance these tax breaks, estimated to total over $63 billion over 
five years, by the reduction or elimination of over 130 federal 
programs valued at over $144 billion.   [Ref. 28] 
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2. Republican   Tax   Cut   Proposals 
The Republicans also support a package of tax cuts, but of 
more substance than that of the President.   In addition to a series of 
individual and family tax provisions similar to Clinton's proposal, 
the House Republicans have advocated a capital gains tax cut and 
certain tax breaks for small businesses.   These tax reduction 
proposals, valued at almost $190 billion over five years, would be 
paid for by $100 billion in cuts in discretionary spending programs, 
reductions in spending on Medicare, and an increase in pension 
contributions reouired of federal employees. [Ref. 1i] 
3. Controversy   Surrounding   Tax   Proposals 
Both sets of tax cuts have sparked controversy within and 
between parties on Capital Hill.    Some Democrats feel that the 
Republican tax breaks are too extensive, and complain that even the 
cuts proposed by Clinton are to be financed through cuts in 
entitlement programs.    Many Republicans argue that legislation 
reducing taxes should not be enacted until after the CBO certifies 
that Congress's spending cuts would actually balance the budget by 
2002.    Furthermore, they contend that any tax cuts should be paid for 
by additional economic benefits resulting from the implementation 
of such a deficit reduction plan (i.e., reduction in debt interest 
payments and increased revenues due to economic growth).   [Ref. 11] 
The nature of this year's budget debate, therefore, is such that 
any discussion of tax cuts cannot be made without considering their 
impact on both the balancing of the budget and projected cuts in 
spending, especially entitlement cuts.    The next chapter provides a 
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brief discussion of the economic and budgetary implications of a 
balanced budget. 
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IV.   ECONOMIC and BUDGETARY IMPLICATIONS 
of A BALANCED BUDGET 
Most economic analysts agree that a balanced budget by 2002 
would yield a "fiscal dividend" through the reduction of federal 
interest rates and an increase in federal revenues.   In fact, CBO 
estimates this dividend could total approximately $170 billion over 
seven years. [Ref. 14]   But the economic attractiveness of a balanced 
budget often upstages the means through which such an ambitious 
goal is achieved.   The requirement for reductions in mandatory and 
discretionary spending and a long-term conservative fiscal policy 
will make it difficult for the 104th Congress to keep its pledges 
regarding defense spending and tax reform intact.   This chapter 
briefly discusses the advantages associated with a balanced budget, 
and highlights various federal spending options that face the 104th 
Congress as it develops a plan to fulfill this goal. 
A. ADVANTAGES OF A BALANCED BUDGET 
Theoretically, real gains towards reducing the deficit and 
balancing the budget would represent a reduction in the 
government's need to borrow money.   This decrease in the 
government's competition for funds in private capital markets would 
lower interest rates.      Savings would result from reductions in both 
long and short-term interest rates. CBO estimates long-term 
interest rates could drop by 1-2 percentage points.    The reduction in 
short term rates, however, is more difficult to estimate because 
these rates are more closely linked to the monetary policy of the 
Federal Reserve Board.    Nevertheless, lower interest rates represent 
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a   reduction in the cost of federal payments for interest on the debt. 
[Ref. 14] 
CBO contends that growth in the GDP will continue at 2.4 
percent through 2005, provided policy changes necessary to balance 
the budget do not fall especially hard on private saving or public 
investments.   But a balanced budget by 2002 could allow the 
economy to grow moderately faster (about .1 percentage point a 
year) by redirecting resources away from public and private 
consumption and toward investment.    Additionally, a stronger 
economy represents an increase in federal revenues (i.e., income, 
corporate, and FICA taxes), less reliance on foreign loans, and 
subsequent lower interest payments to service the debt owned by 
foreigners. [Ref. 14] 
Neither lower interest rates nor increased growth are 
guaranteed to result from the deficit reduction process.    There still 
remains great uncertainty among economists about how balancing 
the budget directly affects capital markets and growth. 
Additionally, although relatively stable, the U.S. economy remains 
unpredictable.    The potential for runaway inflation, or an unexpected 
recession, always exists.    Finally, the success of the balanced 
budget initiative depends on the monetary policies enacted by the 
Fed to offset the policies of fiscal restraint. 
B. FEDERAL SPENDING OPTIONS 
CBO estimates that the deficit in 2002, if current policies 
continue, would be $322 billion.    Federal spending is projected to be 
$2.2 trillion, and revenues $1.9 trillion.    Of the $2.2 trillion in 
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spending, approximately $1.3 trillion (or 60 percent) would result 
from outlays for mandatory programs (mostly for Social Security, 
Medicare, and Medicaid) and $626 billion (28 percent) would stem 
from discretionary spending.    Defense spending would represent 
approximately half of the discretionary amount if current spending 
patterns persist. [Ref. 9] 
If all deficit reductions were to come from spending alone 
(i.e., without raising taxes), a 13 percent reduction from the 
projected 2002 level would be required to bring spending in line 
with revenues in that year.    If Social Security outlays were excluded 
from that base subject to spending reductions, as they have been, 
the necessary cut in the remainder of the budget would increase to 
17 percent.    If, in addition to excluding Social Security, defense 
spending was not increased, but was maintained at real 1995 levels, 
the reduction in the remainder of the budget to achieve budgetary 
balance would increase to 22 percent.   This base would include all 
non-Social Security outlays for mandatory spending (to include 
Medicare and Medicaid) and all nondefense discretionary spending. 
[Ref. 9] 
The figures above demonstrate that it will be extremely 
difficult for the 104th Congress to balance the budget within seven 
years, increase defense spending and reduce taxes while not 
tampering with Social Security.    Medicare and Medicaid and 
nondefense discretionary spending will be forced to absorb the bulk 
of the budget cuts required to balance the budget by 2002. 
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Chapters V through VII evaluate the evolution of the FY 1996 
budget preparation process, to include budget resolution, 
authorization and appropriation for defense, and reconciliation. 
They focus on three areas of interest: entitlement spending 
(especially Medicare and Medicaid), defense spending, and federal 
revenues.     The next chapter in particular compares the separate 
House and Senate budget resolutions, and evaluates how the two 
chambers compromised in these main topics of concern in the 
concurrent budget resolution. 
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V.   FY 1996 BUDGET RESOLUTIONS 
This chapter is divided into two parts.    The first part assesses 
the differences between the House budget resolution, the Senate 
budget resolution, and President Clinton's second budget proposal. 
The second part evaluates how the two congressional chambers 
resolved these differences in their concurrent budget resolution. 
The House and Senate budget resolutions set independent 
targets for new budget authority, outlays, revenues, deficits or 
surpluses, and the total federal debt from fiscal 1996 through fiscal 
2002.    In the concurrent resolution, the two chambers compromise, 
if necessary, and establish mutually agreeable spending targets both 
for the government as a whole and for broad functional categories. 
This chapter focuses primarily on deficit reduction, defense and 
entitlement spending, and the federal revenue portions of the budget 
resolution. 
A.       COMPARISON OF HOUSE BUDGET RESOLUTION, SENATE 
BUDGET RESOLUTION, AND CLINTON'S SECOND BUDGET 
PROPOSAL 
The House budget resolution (H Con Res 67) was adopted 
May 18 on a nearly party-line vote of 238-193.   One Republican 
voted against the measure and eight Democrats voted for it.   The 
Senate passed its version of the budget resolution (S Con Res 13) 
May 25 with a straight party-line vote of 54-46. [Ref. 29] In mid- 
June, President Clinton submitted a second, more aggressive, budget 
proposal in which the deficit is completely eliminated within ten 
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years.    (The President's first proposal had been criticized by 
Democrats and Republicans for being "defeatist" in that it did not 
offer a comprehensive plan to reduce the deficit).     Table 5 outlines 
the savings proposed by these three separate plans, and is followed 
by an explanation of their contents and a comparison of their 
differences. 
Table  5.   Comparison  of  Federal  Savings  and   Tax  Cuts 
Contained   in   1995   House  and   Senate   Budget   Resolutions  and 
the   Second   Clinton   Budget   Proposal   ($   in   Billions). 
From Ref. 30 
Tota! Deficit 
Reduction 







House Plan 756 353 288 187 -67.8/192 219 
Senate Plan 958 0 256 175 0/190 209 
Clinton 
Proposal 
520 105 128 54 3/197 36 
1.   Total   Deficit   Reduction 
The House budget resolution included a $756 billion reduction 
in the deficit over a seven year period.   The plan would cut spending 
by $1.04 trillion, but that number is reduced by the House's net tax 
cuts of $287 billion.   Of the House savings, $256 billion would 
result from lower interest payments on the national debt.    $146 
billion of that would come from an economic "bonus" that CBO has 
projected would materialize if Congress passed a plan that would 
actually balance the budget. [Ref. 30] 
The Senate deficit reduction plan of $958 billion represented 
spending cuts alone.   According to the Senate plan, up to $170 billion 
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in tax cuts could be authorized only if a deficit reduction plan is 
enacted and the CBO certified that it would balance the budget by 
2002.    Clinton's plan would reduce the deficit by $520 billion over 
seven years, and by $1.1 trillion over ten years.   Of the seven year 
savings, $184 billion would come from lower interest payments on 
the national debt and $110 billion would come from the economic 
"bonus." [Ref. 30] 
2. Tax  Cuts 
The House plan contained $353 billion in tax cuts, primarily 
targeted at families and businesses.   The plan included a $500 per- 
child tax credit to families earning up to $200,000 a year, as well 
as reducing individual and corporate capital gains taxes.   As 
previously mentioned, the Senate version did not allow any tax 
reform unless certain conditions have been met. 
President Clinton proposed $105 billion in tax cuts, including a 
$500 per-child credit for families earning up to $65,000, an 
education reduction for college and graduate school tuition, and 
expanded IRA's that would allow couples earning up to $80,000 and 
single people earning up to $50,000 to make tax-deferred contribu- 
tions. [Ref. 30] 
3. Medicare 
The House proposed $288 billion in savings, achieved by 
reducing the growth rate of the program from 10 percent a year to 
an average of about 5.4 percent a year. The Senate plan was similar, 
proposing $256 billion in savings over seven years, achieved by 
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reducing the growth rate to 7.1 percent a year. 
The Clinton Administration's plan, however, proposed much 
less savings ($128 billion) through reductions in Medicare. 
Additionally, Clinton proposes to combine these cuts with small 
expansions in health insurance coverage costing about $28.3 billion. 
The expansion would include a six-month health insurance subsidy 
for people who lose their jobs, an expanded tax deduction for the 
self-employed, and grants to states for care for the elderly and 
disabled. [Ref. 30] 
4.   MedJcaid 
The House and Senate plans proposed $187 and $175 billion in 
savings, respectively, achieved by converting the federal share of 
the Medicaid program to a block grant and transferring it to the 
states.   Additionally, a portion of the savings would be generated by 
gradually reducing growth from about 10 percent a year to 4 percent 
a year. 
As with Medicare, the Clinton plan proposed substantially less 
savings ($54 billion) than the congressional plans.    Clinton would 
achieve this savings by capping the program's expenditures on a per 
capita basis.   He would also allow states to set-up managed care 
plans without seeking a federal waiver and to reduce payments to 
hospitals that have high numbers of uninsured or underinsured 
patients. [Ref. 30] 
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5. Discretionary   Spending 
The Senate resolution proposed no savings for defense, instead 
incorporating the administration's first proposal of a $25 billion 
increase over seven years, which would keep defense spending at or 
above a "hard" freeze (unadjusted for inflation).     The second Clinton 
plan, however, actually included a net $3 billion savings in defense 
in FY 1996.   The House version added $67.8 billion in spending above 
the Senate's proposed spending level. 
Both the House and the Senate proposed approximately $190 
billion in savings in non-defense discretionary spending, measured 
against a freeze at the 1995 enacted level.    President Clinton 
proposed $197 billion in savings from this category, advocating cuts 
averaging 20 percent in all domestic programs, with the exception 
of a handful of favored administration initiatives that would get a 
small increase (i.e., education and violent crime control). [Ref. 30] 
6. Other   Mandatory   Programs 
Both the House and the Senate favor over $200 billion in 
savings from entitlements other than Social Security, Medicare, or 
Medicaid.    Targeted programs include the earned-income tax credit 
for the working poor, several welfare programs, federal pensions for 
civilian and military retirees, veterans' benefits, farm subsidies and 
student loans. 
President Clinton proposed to cut $38 billion from several 
poverty programs including Aid to Families with Dependent Children, 
the earned income tax credit, and benefits for immigrants.   Other 
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programs such as farm subsidies and veterans' programs would 
increase by $2 billion. [Ref. 30] 
B. CONCURRENT BUDGET RESOLUTION 
On June 29, after approximately one month of deliberations, 
the conference report on the budget resolution was adopted in the 
House on a vote of 239-194 and in the Senate, 54-46. [Ref. 29] 
1.   Highlights   of   the   Conference   Resolution 
Highlights of the conference agreement on the budget 
resolution  include $894 billion  in total deficit reduction, $182 
billion in Medicaid savings, $270 billion in Medicare savings, a $58 
billion increase in outlays for defense spending, and $175 billion in 
savings in the category of other mandatory spending.   Once CBO 
validates Congress' claim that it can successfully produce the $894 
billion in spending cuts by 2002, up to $245 billion in tax cuts can 
be authorized. [Ref. 29] 
The conference report also imposes new caps on discretionary 
spending from FY 1996 through fiscal 2002, including specific caps 
for broad categories of defense and non-defense spending through 
fiscal 1998.   The new caps would replace and extend those caps first 
enacted in the 1990 BEA and amended and extended by the 1993 
Omnibus Reconciliation Act of 1993 and the fiscal 1995 budget 
resolution. [Ref. 31] 
The caps would apply to both budget authority and expected 
outlays for each fiscal year.   The caps would apply to both chambers 
but would be enforceable only in the Senate, and only for fiscal 
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1996.    Any appropriations bill whose total exceeded these targets 
for FY 1996 would be barred from Senate consideration by a 
parliamentary point of order.    A 60-vote majority would be required 
to override the point of order.    Enactment of a budget reconciliation 
bill pursuant to the budget resolution would extend Senate 
enforcement of the caps through fiscal 2002.   [Ref. 31]   Table 6 
shows the new discretionary spending caps. 
Table   6.   New   Discretionary   Spending   Caps   FY   1996-2002 
fiscal   ] /ears,   dollar   amounts   in   billions).   After   Ref.   32 
1996 1 997 1998 1999 2002 2001 2002 
Defense 
Budget 265.4 268.0 269.7 - - - - 
Authority 
Outlays 264.0 265.7 264.5 - - - - 
Non- ■'■ 
Defense 
Budget 219.7 214.5 221.0 - - - - 
Authority 




Budget 485.1 482.4 490.7 482.2 489.4 496.6 498.8 
Authority 
Outlays 531.8 520.3 512.6 510.5 514.2 516.4 515.1 
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Table 7 shows the totals projected by the conference report on 
the fiscal 1996 budget resolution for each year from fiscal 1996 
through fiscal 2002.    To facilitate comparison, figures are also 
shown for the House and Senate-adopted versions of the budget. 
Table 8 displays the House and Senate's initial and final budget 
authority (BA) and outlay (O) proposals for spending by function for 
FY 1996. 
Table   7 
(fiscal   ' 
.   Congressional   Budget   Totals,   FY 
/ears,   dollar   amounts   in   billions). 
1996 
After 
-   2002 
Ref.   32 
1996     {     1997 1 998 1999 2000 2001 2002 
Budget 
Authority: I 
House $1,593.6 $1,645.3 $1,686.0 $1,735.6 $1,774.9 $1,803.4 $1,841.1 
Senate 1,575.7 1,617.6 1,674.2 1,732.4 1,802.7 1,845.5 1,907.5 




House 1,587.8 1,625.9 1,650.9 1,703.9 1,749.0 1,783.0 1,814.7 
Senate 1,575.1 1,603.8 1,644.3 1,707.1 1,775.3 1,820.7 1,884.0 
Final 1,587.5 1,626.9 1,661.4 1,718.0 1,778.2 1,821.7 1,876.4 
Revenues: 
House 1,432.2 1,450.5 1,511.0 1,569.6 1,641.3 1,722.4 1,815.2 
Senate 1,418.0 1,475.9 1,546.9 1,620.7 1,700.9 1,790.9 1,885.3 
Final 1,417.2 1,474.7 1,545.6 1,617.6 1,697.4 1,788.6 1,882.8 
Deficit 
/Surplus: 
House -155.6     i     -175.5 -139.9 -134.3 -107.8 -60.6 .5 
Senate -157.1 -127.9 -97.5 -86.4 -74.3 -29.8 1.3 
Final -170.3 -152.2 -115.8 -100.4 -80.8 -33.1 6.4 
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Table 8.   Propos 
fiscal  years,   d< 
ed S 
)llar 
pending  by  Fun 
amounts   in   bil 
ction,   FY  1996 
ions).   After   Ref .   32 
Category House Senate Final 
National    Defense BA $267.3 $257.7 $264.7 
0 265.1 261.1 263.1 
International     Affairs BA 15.B 15.4 263.1 
0 17.0 16.9 17.0 
General    Science *\A 16.7 16.7 16.7 
0 16.9 16.7 16.8 
Energy BA 4.4 2.9 4.6 
0 4.3 2.7 4.5 
Natural     Resources BA 19.3 19.5 19.5 
0 20.2 20.4 20.3 
Agriculture ;?A 13.0 13.1 13.1 
o 11.8 11.9 11.8 
Commerce/Housing ^A 6.4 6.6 6.7 
O -7.0 -7.0 -6.9 
Transportation BA 40.5 36.5 36.6 
0 38.8 38.3 38.9 
Community     Devel. BA 6.7 5.8 6.6 
O 9.9 9.8 9.9 
Education/Training BA 45.7 49.0 48.4 
O 52.3 52.6 53.4 
Health BA 121.9 121.1 121.0 
O 122.3 121.0 121.1 
Medicare BA 179.1 171.9 176.1 
O 176.8 169.5 173.7 
Income    Security BA 222.7 226.3 225.9 
O 225.0 225.9 227.6 
Social    Security BA 354.3 354.3 354.3 
O 354.2 354.2 354.2 
Veterans'     Benefits äA 37.6 37.4 37.5 
O 36.9 36.9 36.9 
Justice PIA 17.B 20.0 19.B 
O 17.8 19.6 18.7 
Gen.    Govt. BA 11.6 12.5 12.4 
O 12.4 13.0 12.9 
Net    Interest BA 256.4 258.5 25B.9 
0 256.4 258.5 258.9 
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2. The   Cunton   Proposal 
Throughout the process of reaching agreement on the budget 
resolution, the Republicans dismissed the substance of Clinton's 
budget and questioned the numbers on which it was based.   They 
charged that the President's plan would come nowhere near 
balancing the budget when measured against the deficit projections 
used by Congress.   CBO's analysis of the Clinton budget supported the 
GOP view, indicating that the administration's spending cuts would 
leave a deficit of $209 billion in 2005, when Clinton was projecting 
a balanced budget. [Ref. 30]   However innocuous, Clinton's proposal 
did demonstrate ?hat he had repositioned balancing of the budget to 
the top of his agenda, and that he was willing to work with the 
Republican-led  Congress towards fulfilling this goal. 
3. Looking   Ahead 
Republicans in both chambers were elated over the initial 
success of their balanced budget plans.    However, the specifics of 
the resolution have yet to be resolved; these details are to be 
worked out through the reconciliation and authorization/ 
appropriation processes.    Potential issues of internal debate include 
welfare, Medicare and Medicaid reform and tax cuts.   Also, the 
President's right to veto any appropriation bill with which he is not 
satisfied represents an additional external pressure on Congress. 
The Clinton Administration has already expressed dissatisfaction 
with the (health care) entitlement and defense spending levels 
proposed in the budget resolution. 
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The next chapter compares the authorization and appropriation 
bills for defense spending.    Chapter VII evaluates in greater detail 
the FY 1996 budget reconciliation process, focusing on Medicare, 
Medicaid, and tax reform. 
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VI. FY 1996 DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION 
AND APPROPRIATION BILLS 
This chapter focuses on the FY 1996 defense authorizations 
and appropriations bills, and is divided into two sections.    The first 
compares the House and Senate FY 1996 defense authorization bills, 
and discusses how each differs from President Clinton's June 
proposal for defense funding.    Both the House and Senate exceeded 
the defense funding levels requested by the President, but the 
contents of each chambers' bills were remarkably different.    The 
section concludes with a description of how these differences were 
reconciled in the conference agreement.   The second section of this 
chapter highlights the 1996 defense appropriation bills, focusing on 
the appropriations conference report submitted to Congress in late 
September. 
A.   AUTHORIZATION   BILLS 
1.   House   Authorization   Bill 
The House National Security Committee (HNSC) approved its 
defense authorization bill on 24 May by a vote of 48-3.   The bill (HR 
1530) authorized $267.3 billion for defense spending, $9.5 billion 
more than Clinton proposed. [Ref. 33] 
The bulk of this increase (about two-thirds) would be used to 
fund an accelerated weapons development program, primarily an 
anti-missile defense system.    The remainder would be used to 
purchase more of certain existing weapon systems.    In addition to 
providing funds for a new navy amphibious ship, two high-speed 
cargo ships, and 12 Air Force fighters, the bill provides $553 million 
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to purchase components for two additional B-2 stealth bombers that 
would be fully funded in FY 1997. [Ref. 33] 
The House bill rejected Clinton's $1.5 billion request for a 
third Seawolf submarine, and cut several non-defense related 
programs.    Specifically, the bill cut $171  million from the $371 
Nunn-Lugar program to help former Soviet republics dismantle their 
nuclear weapons and weapons infrastructure.    It also excluded 
funding for the Technology Reinvestment Program, a Clinton 
initiative intended to fund "dual-use" technologies that have both 
military and commercial applications.    [Ref. 33] 
The House bill affected several other military-related, but 
socially controversial issues. One provision of the bill would require 
that military personnel with HIV be discharged, and another would 
bar female service members or dependents from obtaining abortions 
in U.S. Military hospitals abroad. [Ref. 33] 
Despite strong debate regarding the funding for the B-2 bomber 
and the abortion provision, HR 1530 passed on June 15 (300-126) 
nearly intact.   Over the objections of HNSC Chairman Floyd Spence, 
R-S.C, and his allies, the bill was amended to include a burden- 
sharing amendment, intended to make U.S. allies in Europe pay for 
stationing U.S. Forces on their soil, and dropped funding for a $50 
million nuclear reactor opposed by an influential lobby group. 
[Ref. 34] 
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2.    Senate    Authorization    Bill 
On June 29 the Senate Armed Services Committee passed its 
defense authorization bill by a vote of 18-3.   The bill (S 1026) 
provided $264 .7 billion for defense, slightly less than the House 
version but still $7 billion more than Clinton's proposal.    Like the 
House bill, most of this increase went to weapons procurement and 
development programs.   The committee agreed to add $770 million to 
the  President's $3 billion  request for anti-missile defense 
programs, roughly the same increase as the House.   However, the 
House and the Senate panel split sharply over several other major 
programs.   [Ref. 35] 
The SASC approved funding for the third Seawolf submarine 
and for a large Marine amphibious ship with a complement of 
helicopters.    The bill also allotted $238 million for President 
Clinton's Technology Reinvestment Program, and almost fully funded 
the Nunn-Lugar program.    Additionally, the committee agreed to fund 
virtually the entire $1.6 billion requested by Clinton to clean up 
toxic and hazardous waste at military installations. However, the 
SASC rejected the Navy high-speed cargo ships proposed in the 
House version, and excluded any funding for the B-2 bomber.   It also 
failed to provide funds for additional Air Force F-15 and F-16 
fighter jets, funded in the House bill.    [Ref. 35] 
The Senate passed its defense authorization bill on September 
6 by a vote of 64-34, following nearly a month of debate.   The final 
bill authorized $265.3 billion for defense programs in FY 1996, and 
was passed only after a compromise on the anti-missile defense 
system was reached between Senate Democrats and Republicans. 
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The Democrats were fearful that the initial Republican AMD 
proposal would violate the  1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile  (ABM) treaty 
with Russia, which required that a U.S. or Russian homeland defense 
be deployed at a single base.   The compromise required that, before a 
decision to deploy a national missile defense is made, Congress 
must review the system to ensure that it is affordable and 
operational.    It retreats from the Senate Republican's initial 
commitment to a multi-site system, but mandates that the ground 
based interceptors be capable of deployment at several sites. 
[Ref. 36] 
3.    Authorization    Conference 
The authorization conference opened September 7, and was 
marked by the conferees' inablility to reach an agreement on the 
specific defense programs and levels of funding to be authorized.   As 
of mid-November the conferees had not produced a report.   Blame for 
the indecision has been largely attributed to the chairmen of the 
authorizations committees.    Neither Sen. Strom Thurmond (R-S.C.) 
nor Rep. Floyd Spence (R-S.C.) have provided much guidance, but have 
relied on their staffs to drive the process to conclusion. [Ref. 37] 
During the second week of the conference, Sen. Sam Nunn (D- 
GA), ranking minority member on the SASC, declared that unless the 
Senate's language on anti-missile defense was accepted, the 
conference would end.   That same week, the House voted 415-2, to 
instruct its conferees to stick by its readiness total of $94.7 billion 
and reject the Senate's level of $91.7 billion (President Clinton had 
requested $91.9 billion). [Ref. 38] 
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The authorizes' failure to come to closure would mark the 
first time Congress has failed to adopt a defense authorization bill 
since 1961, when the initial authorization for defense was issued. 
[Ref. 37] 
B.  APPROPRIATION   BILLS 
The individual House and Senate defense appropriation bills 
were passed quickly in both chambers.   The Senate approved its 
$242.7 billion appropriations bill (S 1087) on September 5, by a vote 
of 62-35.   By a 294 to 125 margin the House passed its version of 
the bill (HR 2126) on September 7, recommending $244.2 billion in 
appropriations for defense.    Both bills closely resembled their 
respective companion authorization bills in terms of defense 
programs supported and levels of funding recommended. [Ref. 39] 
1.    Appropriations    Conference 
The appropriations conference report reconciling the two bills 
was completed on September 22, despite the fact that Congress had 
not completed the defense authorization bill.    The report, drafted 
with  relatively  little  controversy between the two chambers, 
appropriated $243.3 billion for defense.    This amount is $868 million 
less than the House version, $556 million more than requested in the 
Senate version, and $7 billion more than the Clinton request. The 
last time Congress appropriated more for defense than an 
administration requested was in 1981 when a new legislature, 
elected with President Reagan, revamped a budget proposal prepared 
in the Carter administration. [Ref. 40] 
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The conference report reconciled several issues that had been 
highly contested between the House and the Senate, and approved 
several programs opposed by the Clinton administration.   The report 
approved a total of $3.4 billion for Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD), 
including $746 million for National Missile Defense, a $375 million 
increase over Clinton's request.    It also approved funding of $493 
million to continue production of the B-2 bomber, and $470 million 
for additional Ai*- Force F-15 and F-16 aircraft.    The conferees also 
provided funding ($700 million) for a third Seawolf submarine, 
despite initial opposition from the House.    [Ref. 38] 
The bill cut the amount of funding sought by the 
administration for the Technology Reinvestment Program by over 
$300 million, appropriating only $195 million, and agreed to fund 
$300 million (approximately 80 percent of the Clinton request) to 
the Nunn-Lugar account to assist Russia in dismantling nuclear 
weapons.    Finally, the report watered down a House provision barring 
funds for U.S. troop deployments in Bosnia unless the President 
received congressional approval.    The only exception to this 
provision would have been the use of American forces to evacuate 
U.N. peacekeepers.   The conferees turned that into a non-binding 
provision expressing the sense of Congress. [Ref. 38] 
Table 9 compares the figures for the FY 1996 defense 
appropriations conference report with the House and Senate 
appropriation requests, Clinton's request, and the actual FY 1995 
defense  appropriations. 
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Table  9.   Defense   Spending   (in  thousands  of  dollars  of  new 
budget   authority).   After  Ref.   39 
FY   95 
Appropriation 
FY   96   Clinton 
Request 
House    Bill Senate    Bill Conference 
Report 




82,819,085 80,800,250 81,483,817 79,940,606 81,552,727 
Procurement 43,124,636 38,662,049 42,876,405 44,460,774 44,089,316 
Research, 
Development, 
and    Testing 





12,772 246 13,895,102 14,567,826 13,969,408 12,167,137 
Total 245,(M8,068 236,386,017 244,039,500 242,725,841 243,293,297 
2.    Appropriations    Conference    Rejected 
The conference report on defense appropriations was rejected 
in the House on September 29 (151-267).    Surprisingly, the rejection 
was not the  result of specific Democratic dissatisfaction with 
defense programs or funding levels (although in fact two-thirds of 
the voting Democrats opposed the bill).   Rather, it occured as a 
result of Republican-led opponents angry that the provision banning 
abortions on military installations overseas had been dropped from 
the bill (approximately two-thirds of the voting Republicans opposed 
the bill on these grounds), combined with Democrats opposed to the 
level of funding or specific programs in the report.     [Ref. 42] 
Despite House Appropriations Committee Chairmen Robert 
Livingston's (R-La.) warnings that any other subsequent version of 
the bill would undermine the "Contract with America's" pledge to 
reverse the decline in U.S. military power, most Republicans insisted 
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that the principle of opposing abortion was too important to be 
subordinated to practical political considerations.    In fact,  Robert 
Dornan (R-Ca.), a leader of the House anti-abortion coalition, was 
quoted as saying "Saint Peter won't ask me, on judgement day, about 
the B-2 bomber or my defense votes," but rather about how hard he 
had tried to protect the lives of the unborn. [Ref. 42] 
3. Final   Appropriations    Bill 
By mid-November, the conferees had amended the conference 
report so that it was acceptable to both chambers.   The defense 
appropriations bid was passed in both the House and Senate on 
November 16. [Ref. 43] 
4. Stopgap   Bills 
In order to avoid a government "shutdown," congressional 
Republicans and President Clinton agreed to give themselves a six- 
week extension past the October 1 start of FY 1996 to get the new 
year's spending bills complete.    During the last week of September, 
Congress approved a continuing resolution (HJ Res 108) in order to 
provide stopgap funding through November 13 for programs funded by 
appropriations bills that Congress had not yet finished. [Ref. 44] 
However, on November 13 President Clinton refused to sign a 
second Continuing  Resolution, despite  last-minute negotiations with 
the Speaker-of-the-House Newt Gingrich (R-Ga.) and Senate Majority 
Leader Sen. Bob Dole (R-Ka).   The President adamently opposed the 
resolution because it contained a provision that would suspend a 
planned reduction of Medicare premiums, a highly controversial 
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issue in congressional reconciliation deliberations.    On November 14, 
the government underwent a "partial shutdown," with all but 
"essential" federal employees instructed not to report to work. 
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VII. FY 1996 RECONCILIATION BILL 
This chapter evaluates the FY 1996 reconciliation process, in 
which tax laws and entitlement programs are changed, or reconciled, 
to achieve the deficit reduction targets set in the FY 96 budget 
resolution.      As specified in this year's resolution, Congress must 
produce the largest spending cut package in its history, over $890 
billion, in order to meet the targets in the budget resolution. 
Unwilling to cut Social Security, Congress turned to the 
fastest growing entitlement programs, Medicare and Medicaid, to 
supplement discretionary spending cuts and provide the bulk of the 
savings.   The FY 96 budget resolution directed $270 billion be cut 
from Medicare, and $182 billion from Medicaid.    Additionally, the 
resolution called for a $245 billion reduction in taxes over the next 
seven years,  following certification  of Congress's deficit  reduction 
plan by CBO.   In other words, the spending cuts must be achieved 
prior to implementation of the tax cuts. 
This chapter is divided into two parts.    The first focuses on 
the contents of the individual House and Senate reconciliation 
packages, paying particular attention to each chambers' plans to cut 
Medicare, Medicaid, and taxes.   Although the two proposals generally 
track each other fairly closely, differences do exist.    The second 
section examines how these differences were settled in the 
reconciliation conference report approved by Congress, and 
discusses those issues that were problematic for Congress while 
attempting to translate the  reconciliation  bill  into  law. 
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A.   RECONCILIATION   BILLS 
1.   The   House   Reconciliation   Package 
On October 26, the House passed HR 2491, the FY 96 budget 
reconciliation bill, on an almost party-line vote of 227-203 (ten 
Republicans voted against the bill, four Democrats voted for it). 
[Ref. 45]   Provided below is a summary of the most controversial and 
relevant components in the bill, namely Medicare, Medicaid, Earned 
Income Tax Credit (EITC), and taxes.   Also provided is a description 
of the bill's provision for defense. 
Medicare - To reach the total of $270 billion in Medicare 
cuts, Republicans recommended a three-pronged approach.   The plan 
would reduce payment rates to doctors and hospitals, increase 
premiums paid by seniors for the optional Part B insurance that 
covers doctor care, and rely on beneficiaries to choose managed care 
or other insurance options.   If this approach does not reach the 
savings targets, a "failsafe" mechanism would cut payments to 
doctors,  hospitals,  and other providers in the traditional fee-for- 
service approach to make up any shortfall. 
The Medicare plan would require up front cuts in payments to 
providers that would account for $152 billion of the savings.    The 
increase in premium payments, which include an "affluence test" 
requiring wealthier beneficiaries to pay more, makes up about $54 
billion.    Expected migration to alternative insurance plans 
represents    savjngs of $31  billion, while the failsafe mechanism 
accounts for the remaining $32 billion. [Ref. 46] 
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Medicaid - The House plan, designed to reduce spending by 
$182 billion over seven years, radically restructures Medicaid by 
ending the federal guarantee of coverage to people who meet certain 
criteria and by capping the amount of money the federal government 
provides to the states.   Under the plan a lump sum of federal money 
would be provided to the states to finance health care for the poor. 
The states would design their own benefit packages and decide who 
is eligible, but would be required to pay for a percentage of the 
benefits with their own money.    [Ref. 46] 
Earned  Income Tax  Credit - The House plan limits the 
availability of the EITC for low income workers.    The proposal would 
save over $20 billion by limiting the availability of the credit and 
scaling back its size.   Workers without children would no longer be 
eligible.     Income eligibility for families is tightened by requiring 
workers to count Social Security benefits and income from IRAs, 
pensions and annuities as part of their adjusted gross income.   The 
credit would be phased out starting in 1996 for workers who earn 
more than $11,630 a year and for families earning more than 
$27,126 a year.    Currently, the EITC is available to families earning 
$28,553 annually    [Ref. 46] 
Taxes - Perhaps the most controversial element of the bill, 
the recommended tax cut has been described as "a big red pimple on 
the deficit reduction's handsome nose." [Ref. 47]   The House package 
includes a tax cut for families and businesses of over $350 billion, 
over $100 billion more than permitted in the budget resolution. 
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Specific decisions about how to change individual's provisions to 
meet that lower amount has to be worked out in conference. 
The House tax bill includes: a $500-per-child tax credit for 
families earning up to $200,000 a year; reduction in the corporate 
capital gains tax from 35 percent to 25 percent and reduction in the 
top individual capital gains tax rate from 28 percent to 19.8 percent. 
Also included in the bill are provisions benefiting corporations 
costing $7.9 billion.     The bill would also raise about $40 billion by 
limiting corporate tax preferences and allowing companies to use 
excess pension :unds for investment. [Ref. 46] 
Defense - Directed to come up with $2.2 billion in savings 
over seven years, the National Security Committee initially moved 
to cut the pensions of thousands of retiring military personnel. 
After intense public pressure, the committee backed down and 
approved instead legislation to sell excess assets from the National 
Defense Stockpile.   In addition, the House plan advances the date for 
the COLA increases for military retirees from October to April, the 
same month civilians receive their increases.    Finally, the plan 
includes the sale of the Naval Petroleum Reserve sites. [Ref. 46] 
2.   The   Senate   Reconciliation   Package 
On October 28, two days after House approval, the Senate 
passed its reconciliation bill (HR 2491), 52-47 on a party line vote. 
[Ref. 48]   A description of the Senate's version of the major 
elements of the package is provided below. 
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Medicare - The Finance committee was more willing than the 
House to put a significant part of the burden on beneficiaries.   This 
was done chiefly by raising the Part B deductible and by setting 
lower thresholds for Part B means-testing ($50,000 in annual 
income for single beneficiaries instead of the House's $75,000, and 
$75,000 for couples instead of the House's $125,000). 
The Senate plan would also raise the Part B premiums more 
than the House version.   The committee avoided the need for a fail- 
safe procedure by strengthening its managed care section, primarily 
by clamping down on the growth of payments for Medicare 
beneficiaries already in options such as HMOs. [Ref. 46] 
Medicaid - The Senate Medicaid plan is different than the 
House plan in that it actually retains the entitlement for pregnant 
women, children, and the disabled.   The plan would allow states to 
determine the benefit packages for those groups, but having 
determined that, would require states to cover all eligible people. 
Members of the Finance Committee also restored protections to 
safeguard spouses of nursing home residents against 
impoverishment and the loss of their family homes, while allowing 
states to set nursing home standards.   The Senate package also uses 
a different baseline for determining federal funding that gives 27 
states more money than under the House plan. [Ref. 46] 
Earned  Income Tax  Credit - The Senate provisions, 
accounting for over $40 billion in savings, are similar to the House 
proposals but have a steeper phase out schedule that essentially 
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would end the indexing of the credit for inflation for families that 
earn more than $11,630 a year.    In determining income eligibility, 
the bill would also require taxpayers to count income from rents and 
royalties and net capital losses. [Ref. 46] 
Taxes - The Senate plan would substantially scale back the 
House tax cut proposal, aiming the per-child tax credit at families 
earning less than $110,000 a year and adding a credit to defray the 
cost of student loans.   The Senate proposal also would provide for a 
smaller cut in corporate capital gains taxes, IRAs would be expanded 
more broadly than in the House, and fewer tax provisions benefitting 
corporations would be ended. [Ref. 46] 
Defense - The Senate did not consider a pension change, but 
rather adopted legislation for the sale of excess stockpile assets 
and the petroleum reserve at Elk Hills.   [Ref. 46] 
B.   CONGRESSIONAL HURDLES 
Despite the fact that CBO certified that both the House and the 
Senate reconciliation plans would provide budget surpluses in 2002, 
several hurdles in translating the plans into law still confront the 
Republicans. [Ref. 49]   Chief among these hurdles are the 
reconciliation conference report, in which the differences in the 
House and Senate plan had to be resolved, 
58 
1.    Reconciliation   Conference   Report 
The House-Senate conference on the reconciliation package 
began the week of October 30.     Although the two plans were in 
general very similar, significant differences (in addition to those 
already discussed) had to be resolved in conference.   A brief 
discussion of some of these "second-tier" differences follows. 
Capital  Gains - The House would index capital gains for 
inflation.   That would allow taxpayers to pay taxes only on the 
difference between the sale price of the asset and the original 
purchase price, after adjusting for inflation.    The Senate has no 
indexing  provision. 
Student   Loans - The House bill would eliminate the Direct 
Loan Program, in which the government bypasses commercial banks 
and other lenders by disbursing aid directly to students.   The Senate 
bill would slow the program's growth significantly but leave it in 
place.    The House also would eliminate the interest-free, six-month 
grace period currently enjoyed by students who receive federally 
guaranteed loans and increase the interest rates on loans to parents 
of undergraduate students.    Both provisions were removed from the 
Senate bill. 
Commerce   Department - The House measure would 
dismantle the Commerce Department.   A similar measure was 
approved by the Senate Government Affairs Committee but was not 
added to the reconciliation bill because it was found to violate rules 
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designed to thwart provisions unrelated to deficit reduction (the 
Byrd rule).   [Ref. 50] 
The reconciliation conference concluded the week of November 
14 after the two chambers managed to compromise on the most 
substantive and controversial issues.    The conference agreement, 
titled "The Balanced Budget Act of 1995," was approved by the 
House on November 17 by a party line vote of 237-189.   The Senate 
approved the bill on the same day, 52-47.   [Ref. 51]    Table 10 
presents the budget totals under the Balanced Budget Act. 
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Table   10.   Budget  Totals   Under   Balanced   Budget   Act  of   1995 
(Includes   Fiscal   Dividend   and   Tax   Cut,   $   Billions). 
After Ref. 52 
1995 199 6 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 
Discre- 
tionary 
Defense 269 264 266 265 268 272 271 271 
Non- 
defense 
277 270 258 253 248 249 246 244 





333             I '52 371 391 411 433 456 480 
Medicare 178 196 211 220 230 251 271 294 
Medicaid 89 97 104 109 113 118 122 127 
Other 139 155 157 162 171 181 182 192 
Subtotal 739 799 843 881 925 984 1031 1093 
Net 
Interest 
233 257 262 261 262 260 254 249 
Total 
Outlays 
1518 1590 1629 1660 1703 1764 1801 1857 
Reve- 
nues 
1357 1412 1440 1514 1585 1665 1756 1861 
Deficit 
/Surplus 
-161 -178 -189 -146 -118 -100 -46 4 
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2.   Troubles   for   the   Bill 
Most congressional Democrats strongly oppose the Republican 
deficit reduction plan as delineated in the Republican reconciliation 
package.   House Minority Leader Richard Gephardt, D-Mo., charged 
that the Republican plan is "..wrong, it's morally wrong, it's the 
wrong thing for our country" because it slashed programs for the 
disadvantaged, for the middle class, and for "growing" the economy 
with aid to education, all to provide tax cuts for the rich.   Rep John 
Dingell (D-Mich.) called it the "worst piece of legislation I've seen 
in 40 years in this body." [Ref. 40] 
A more significant threat to the Republican reconciliation 
package, however, was President Clinton, who had repeatedly 
described the Medicare, Medicaid, and EITC cuts as unacceptable. 
The President opposed the Republican deficit reduction plan because 
he believes it was based upon unnecessary entitlement cuts 
detrimental to American citizens.    It was almost certain, therefore, 
that if left unamended the reconciliation package approved by 
Congress would be vetoed by the President when it reached his desk. 
To demonstrate his resolve on these issues, President Clinton 
vetoed the second congressional Continuing Resolution (CR) on 
November 13 because it included provisions that limited the 
continued growth of these entitlements. [Ref. 51]    This veto resulted 
in the partial shutdown of the government, in which over 800,000 
"non-essential" federal employees were furloughed pending a 
settlement between Congress and the President. 
The Republicans suggested they would be willing to 
compromise on these entitlement issues in the second CR as long as 
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the President agreed to a balanced budget in seven years. [Ref. 53] 
This provision, however, had been non-negotiable for Clinton, who 
promised to veto any CR containing such language.   President Clinton 
recommended instead that Congress either consider his own 10-year 
deficit reduction plan submitted in June, or initiate a total rework 
of the FY 1996 budget. 
3.   Compromise   Achieved 
The President and Congress remained at an impasse over the 
FY 1996 federal budget for six days.   On November 18, however, the 
White House arc Congress agreed on a stop-gap spending measure 
that reopened the government.   This second Continuing Resolution 
not only provided money to keep the government running at 75 
percent of current spending through December 15, but also enabled 
the return to work of the 800,000 furloughed federal employees. 
[Ref. 54] 
President Clinton accepted the Republicans' goal of balancing 
the budget in seven years but insisted on language intended to 
protect his priorities (i.e., Medicare, Medicaid, education and the 
environment) in Jong term negotiations.    The President also wanted 
to avoid tax increases on working families and to have CBO consult 
with the White House budget office and outside experts on the 
economic assumptions. 
The Republicans accepted President Clinton's offer after 
rewording  it (to call for "tax relief" rather than "preventing tax 
increases," for instance) and to add to the list of protected items 
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such matters as agriculture and defense.   The Republicans also 
included a provision for the overhaul of welfare programs.    [Ref. 54] 
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VIII. CONCLUSION 
Despite skepticism expressed by many economists, students of 
the federal budget, the media, and the executive branch, the 
Republican-led 104th Congress accomplished many of the budget 
objectives it had delineated in its "Contract with America" in 
February, 1995.   Congress developed and passed a federal budget plan 
that not only eliminated the deficit by 2002, but that also increased 
defense spendiny, cut taxes, and left Social Security intact. 
However, +he Republicans are only half-way to fulfilling their 
ultimate goal of a $0 deficit, for their plan must be approved by the 
President in order to become law, a very unlikely event at the 
present time.   Although Congress could override an executive veto 
with a two-thirds majority vote in order to pass the Republican 
plan, this event is equally unlikely. 
The FY 1996 federal budget process has included a series of 
often  inter-related federal  budget "firsts" that  has distinguished  it 
from most, if not all, of the previous federal budgets.    In addition to 
being the first Republican-led Congress in over 40 years, this year's 
budget process has many times created unusual divisions within 
Congress.   There have been splits along House and Senate lines, 
between conservatives and moderates, and between an influential 
freshmen class and senior representatives. 
This chapter concludes this study by evaluating the 
distinguishing characteristics of the FY 1996 budget debate.    The 
first part of the chapter addresses the impact the budget process 
has had on the defense budget.   The second section assesses the 
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opportunities and obstacles that confronted the Republicans 
throughout the budget process, and also briefly discusses the role of 
party and election year politics in this year's budget debate. 
A. THE DEFENSE BUDGET 
The FY 1996 defense budget, like most other aspects of this 
year's budget debate, has been plagued by controversy primarily 
centered around funding levels and social issues. 
Congress disregarded the Clinton administration's insistence 
that $236 billion was sufficient to meet the DoD FY 1996 
requirements, and instead recommended $243 billion in defense 
appropriations budget authority for FY 1996, $7 billion more than 
the Clinton proposal.   The bulk of this increase was added to the DoD 
Procurement and Operation and Maintenance (O&M) accounts to 
bolster weapon system  modernization and military "readiness," 
funding levels for which were considered by House Republicans as 
critically deficient.     Additionally,  Congress recommended certain 
"non-traditional" defense spending programs supported by Clinton, 
such as the Defense Technology Program and aid to Russia, be cut. 
Although the $243 billion is approximately $2 billion less than 
FY 1995 defense budget authority, the Republican seven-year deficit 
reduction plan represents an increase of more than $50 billion over 
the Clinton proposal.   In this regard, it can be argued the House 
Republicans honored their promise made in the "Contract" of 
"restoring" defense funds. 
However, the Republicans do not plan for the defense budget is 
to increase throughout the duration of the their seven-year plan. 
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Although the budget resolution directs an increase in defense 
funding for years 1996 and 1997, it caps the total defense budget at 
approximately $270 billion between 1998 and 2002. [Ref. 17] 
Furthermore, the FY 1996 defense appropriations bill will most 
likely face a veto by the President.   To overcome that veto, the 
Republicans may have to reduce the total level of funding for 
defense. 
Additionally,  recall  that the  initial defense appropriations 
conference report was rejected in the House, largely as a result of 
Republican member dissatisfaction with a provision involving a 
social, rather than military issue , i.e., abortion.    Despite the recent 
optimism expressed by the Republican leadership about increased 
defense spending, it is apparent that the defense budget will 
continue to be constrained by economic and social forces for years 
to come. 
B. REPUBLICAN STRENGTHS 
The Republicans were able to make good on their widely 
discounted campaign rhetoric in the fall of 1994 and produced a 
plausible deficit reduction plan largely as a result of strong 
leadership and their adherence to a focused agenda.   Some of the 
factors that enabled the Republicans to achieve this goal are 
reviewed  below 
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1. Leadership 
The Repubiican leadership's motivation and inspiration at the 
beginning of the budget process were largely responsible for a 
deficit eliminating reconciliation package that was passed in  mid- 
November.   The fact that the leadership insisted on a zero deficit 
from the beginning, instead of settling for a major cut, proved 
critical for Congress, for   it helped transform a mere budget debate 
into a "quest." "We have a crusade attitude," explained House Budget 
Chairmen John Kasich (R-Oh) [Ref. 49] 
The Republican leadership was also very disciplined and 
effective, especially towards the end of the budget process, in 
ensuring passage of the reconciliation package.    In mid-October it 
had established a "bicameral budget steering group" composed of the 
top four GOP leaders and the Chairmen of the Appropriations, Budget, 
and tax-writing committees in both chambers.    The group was 
formed to maintain Republican solidarity and to ensure that all 
Republicans completed their assigned tasks.    Such a power-sharing 
steering group is a rarity in Congress, where authority has 
traditionally been centralized among party leaders of the two 
chambers. [Ref. 55] 
2. Focus 
The Republican leadership changed the political dynamics to 
put the Democrats on the defensive during the budget process. 
President Clinton's initial budget proposal offered no serious deficit 
reduction, but instead inspired the Republicans to make good on 
campaign promises that most administration officials believed the 
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GOP could not fulfill.   The more the Republicans progressed toward 
fulfilling their goal of developing a seven-year zero deficit budget 
plan, the less comfortable the Democrats became.   By June even the 
most liberal Democrats conceded that the fundamental issue was 
balancing the budget, prompting President Clinton to offer his own 
10-year balanced-budget plan shortly thereafter. 
C. OBSTACLES 
Despite the strong leadership and shared sense of mission and 
purpose, the Republicans were not without their difficulties during 
the budget process.    Independent and stubborn freshmen, ineffective 
defense authorizing  committees,  procedural  irregularities,  and 
unusual alliances all represented unanticipated obstacles that the 
Republican leadership had to overcome in order to successfully 
complete its agenda. 
1„   Freshman   Class 
Only one spending bill, military construction (PL 104-32) had 
become law by October 14, two weeks into the new fiscal year. 
[Ref. 56]   Many of the spending bills have yet to be approved at the 
time of this writing because of intra-party disputes among House 
Republicans, particularly the younger, more conservative freshman, 
who have been unwilling to compromise with more moderate 
members on ideological grounds.   For example, the defense 
appropriations conference report was rejected in the House largely 
as a result of opposition to the bill's abortion provision by freshmen 
members. 
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The Freshman class has been able to exert remarkable political 
influence upon the Republican leadership.   This clout was most 
apparent in the case of freshman Rep. Mark Neumann, R-Wis., who 
was fired from the House National Security Subcommittee on 
Appropriations in late September presumably for voting against the 
committee's defense spending bill.    The majority of the freshman 
class, angered bu the way with which Neumann was treated, 
immediately rallied to his support, and threatened to hold up 
passage of an Agricultural appropriations bill if the situation was 
not rectified by the House Speaker.   By the end of the next day Rep. 
Neumann was given a prized seat on the House Budget Committee. 
[Ref. 57] 
2.      Inability  to   Agree 
Also embarrassing for the Republicans was the defense 
authorizing conferees' inability to reach an agreement after over 
two months of deliberation (conference began the week of 
September 11).    Ironically, this impasse among the authorizers 
comes during the first year of control of both congressional 
chambers by a Republican party that has long prided itself on 
defense and is eager to add more money to defense than was 
requested by President Clinton. 
Without an authorization bill, Congress has been left without a 
definitive stand in critical defense policy areas, to include missile 
defense, participation in U.N. peacekeeping, and U.S. aid to Russia. 
Instead, the House and Senate have been forced to construct and pass 
individual appropriations and  reconciliation  packages without policy 
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guidance from the defense authorizers.    This calls into question the 
significance and relevance of the Senate Armed Services Committee 
and House National Security Committee, which traditionally have 
been influential in determining the U.S. defense policy and shaping 
the force structure.    [Ref. 37] 
3. Procedural    Irregularities 
The Republicans initially proceeded outside the regular budget 
process to comply with their contract and develop a realistic deficit 
reduction plan.   Specifically, House Budget Chairmen John Kasich, R- 
Oh., recommended early in the budget process (March) to use 
discretionary spending cuts to offset tax cuts.    This was a clear 
violation of budget law, which required that tax cuts be offset only 
with tax increases or cuts in entitlement programs.    To avoid a fight 
over budget rules, the Republicans managed to approve procedural 
changes that lowered and extended the caps on discretionary 
spending.   [Ref. 58] 
4. Unusual   Alliances 
This year's budget process was also distinguished by cross- 
party alliances in Congress.   Although such alliances are not 
uncommon, the identities of some of their members were surprising. 
Budget Chairman Kasich, one of the more outspoken leaders of the 
"Republican Revolution," teamed with Rep. Ronald Dellums, Calif., 
the senior Democrat on the National Security Committee, to draft an 
amendment to the House defense authorization bill that would have 
deleted funding for B-2 bomber construction.    While Kasich was 
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concerned about the financial impact the B-2 program would have on 
the defense budget in the out years, Dellums opposed the funding on 
strictly ideological grounds, arguing that more money was needed 
for social domestic programs, not for defense.    [Ref. 34] 
D.  ELECTION-YEAR  POLITICS 
The FY 1936 budget debate has been unusual in that it is 
occurring before a presidential election year. The current stand-off 
between the congressional leadership and the President 
demonstrates  ^ne significant  influence these  preliminary election 
politics are having over the FY 1996 budget debate. 
President Clinton, seeking reelection in 1996, desires to 
appear as a decisive leader, determined to protect certain programs 
and priorities (Medicare, Medicaid, education, and environmental 
protection) that are apparently threatened by the Republican budget. 
However, there is only a $78 billion difference between the 
Republican Medicare spending proposal and the President's. [Ref. 59] 
This $78 billion represents only $10 billion a year over a seven year 
period - "budget dust" when considered in the context of the entire 
budget. 
Senate Majority Leader Robert Dole, R-Ka., is currently the 
Republican front-runner for the presidential elections.    Speaker-of- 
the-House Newt Gingrich, R-Ga., has not completely ruled out the 
possibility of running against Dole for the Republican nomination. 
It is essential for both these individuals, therefore, to push through 
their seven-year deficit reduction plan in order to bolster their 
political images before the commencement of active campaigning. 
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Additionally, sue'» a victory would strike a blow to the President's 
credibility and confidence as a leader. 
Additionallv,  the  pre-election competition  between the 
Republican leaders and the President has infiltrated the FY 1996 
budget debate in the form of often petty personal attacks.   Speaker 
Gingrich accused President Clinton of forcing him to sit in the rear 
of Air Force One during a flight to Israel for the funeral of Prime 
Minister Rabin so as to avoid discussing the budget. Gingrich claims 
that this inciden* was in part the cause for Congress presenting the 
President with a stiff second continuing resolution. (As a form of 
apology to the Gingrich, the President's staff sent the Speaker's 
office a box of Air Force One M&M candies).   [Ref. 60] 
The 104th Congress did indeed produce a plan that balanced 
the budget within seven years and increased defense spending above 
the President's proposed budget while cutting health and welfare 
entitlements and taxes.    However, if left unamended, it is almost 
certain to be vetoed by the President.   This year's budget debate, 
more than any other, represents a case study of the extent to which 
legislative, economic, political, and social dynamics can impact the 
federal budget process. 
73 
74 
LIST OF REFERENCES 
1. Hook, Janet, 'New Congress Poised to Turn Tradition on Its Head," 
Congressional Quarterly. December 31, 1994. 
2. Hager, George and Alissa Rubin, "Congress Gives Resounding Yes 
to Balanced-Budget Plan," Congressional  Quarterly. July 1, 1995. 
3. Peterson, Peter, "Facing Up," Atlantic Monthly. October, 1993. 
4. Fraley, Colette, "Medicare Cuts Yet to be Fleshed Out," 
Congressional  Quarterly. July 1, 1995. 
5. Congressional   Quarterly. "Republicans' Initial Promise: 100-Day 
Debate on 'Contract',"   November 12, 1994. 
6. Towell, Pat, "Military Readiness Funds Gain Final Approval," 
Congressional   Quarterly. April 8, 1995. 
7. Presentation by Dick D'Amato, Senior Budget Analyst for Sen. 
Byrd (D-WVA), February 9, 1995. 
8. National Journal. "How they Voted - And Why," December, 1994. 
9. Congressional Budget Office. "Reducing the Deficit: Spending and 
Revenue Options," February, 1995. 
10. Congressional Quarterly. "House GOP Offers Descriptions of 
Bills to Enact Contract," November 19, 1994. 
11. Rubin, Alissa, "GOP Leaders Ready to Deal on Troubled Tax-Cuts 
Bill," Congressional   Quarterly. April 1, 1995. 
12. Office of Management and Budget. "A Citizen's Guide to the 
Federal Budget of the Unites States Government, Fiscal Year 1996," 
February, 1995. 
13. Office of Management and Budget. "Historical Tables - 
Historical Deficit as a Percent of GDP," February, 1994. 
75 
14. Congressional Budget Office. "The Economic and Budget Outlook: 
An Update," August, 1995. 
15. Schick, Allen, The Capacity to Budget. Washington, D.C.: Urban 
Institute   Press,   1990. 
16. Congressional  Research Service. "A Defense Budget Primer," 
March 9, 1993. 
17. Congressional Quarterly. "New Spending Caps," May 20, 1995. 
18. Wildovsky, Aaron, The New Politics of the Budgetary Process. 
(Scott, Foresman, and Company: Glenview, Illinois), 1988. 
19. Cahill, Kenneth. Entitlements and Other Mandatory Spending. 
CRS Report for Congress, April 17, 1992. 
20. Doyle, Richard, "The Distribution of Disappointment: Congress, 
the Deficit and  Budget Reconciliation," forthcoming,  1996. 
21. Congressional Budget Office, The Economic and Budget Outlook: 
Fiscal Years 1996-2000. January, 1995. 
22. Ippolito, Dennis. Blunting the Sword. Budget Policy and the 
Future of Defense.   (Washington, D.C.: National Defense University), 
1994. 
23. Casey, Brian, "Financial Implications of DoD Participation in 
Peacekeeping Operations," Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, 
California,  December,  1994. 
24. Towell, Pat, "Military Readiness Funds Gain Final Approval," . 
Congressional   Quarterly. April 8, 1995. 
25. General Accounting Office. "Future Years Defense Program: 
Optimistic Estimates Leads to Billions in Overprogramming," July, 
1994. 
76 
26. Daggett, Stephen, and Keith Berner, "Items in the Department of 
Defense Budget That May Not Be Directly Related to Traditional 
Military Capabilities," Congressional Research Service Memorandum, 
March 21, 1994. 
27. Congressional  Budget Office. "An Analysis of the 
Administration's Future Years Defense Program for 1995 through 
1999," January,  1995. 
28. Fiscal Year 1996 President's Budget Submission. 
29. Hager, George and Alissa Rubin, "Congress Gives a Resounding 
Yes To Balanced-Budget Plan." Congressional Quarterly. July 1, 
1995. 
30. Congressional Quarterly. "Clinton Budget Proposal Compared 
with House, Senate Plans," June 17, 1995. 
31. Congressional  Quarterly. "New Spending Caps," July 15, 1995. 
32. Fiscal 1996 budget resolution (H Con Res 67-H Rept 104-159). 
33. Towell, Pat, "House Panel's Bill Spurns Clinton's Priorities," 
Congressional Quarterly. May, 27, 1995. 
34. Towell, Pat, "House Votes to Sweep Aside Clinton's Priorities," 
Congressional  Quarterly. June 17, 1995. 
35. Towell, Pat, "Senate Faces Floor Battles Over Arms, ABM 
Policy," Congressional  Quarterly. July 1, 1995. 
36. Towell, Pat, "Compromise on Missile Defenses Ensures Senate 
Bill's Passage," Congressional  Quarterly. September 9, 1995. 
37. Graham, Bradley, "Defense Conferees Narrow Differences," The 
Washington Post. November 4, 1995. 
38. Cassata, Donna, "Veto Looms as Conferees Agree on B-2 Funds, 
Abortion Curb," Congressional  Quarterly. September 23, 1995. 
77 
39. Source: Conference Report on HR 2126 - H Rept 104-261. 
40. Cassata, Donna, "House Flouts Clinton Policies on B-2 
Production, Abortion," Congressional  Quarterly. September 9, 1995. 
41. Graham, Bradley, "House Votes to Authorize $9.7 Billion More for 
Defense Than Requested," The Washington Post. June 16, 1995. 
42. Towell, Pat, "Rebellious House Republicans Help Crush Defense 
Bill," Congressional  Quarterly. September 30, 1995. 
43. Erlich, Jeff, 'Defense Hike May Draw Veto," Defense News. 
November 20-26   1995. 
44. 104th Congress, H.J. Res. 115 (Continuing Resolution), 
November 9, 1995. 
45. Hager, George, "In the House, GOP Leadership Scores 
Comfortable Win," Congressional  Quarterly. October 28, 1995. 
46. Congressional  Quarterly. "Committee Action Compared," 
October 14, 1995. 
47. Tell, David, "Three Cheers for the Tax Cut," The Weekly 
Standard. October 30, 1995. 
48. Rubin, Alissa, "Senate GOP Appeases Moderates, Gets Majority 
Behind Bill," Congressional  Quarterly. October 28, 1995. 
49. Hager, George, "Historic Votes Add Momentum As Conferees 
Start Work," Congressional  Quarterly. October 28, 1995. 
50. Congressional Quarterly. "Problem Areas for Negotiators," 
October 28, 1995. 
51. Rosenbaum, David, "House and Senate Approve GOP's 7 year 
Budget Plan; President Promises A Veto," The New York Times. 
November 18, 1995. 
78 
52. Senate Budget Committee, November 17, 1995. 
53. Hager, George, "To Deal or Not to Deal," Congressional Quarterly. 
October 14, 1995. 
54. Purdum, Todd "Clinton Accepts GOP Goal of Balancing the Budget 
in Seven Years," The New York Times. November 20, 1995. 
55. National Journal. "Bettering the Odds of a Budget Deal," October 
21,  1995. 
56. Cassata, Donna, "GOP Leaders Walk a Fine Line To Keep Freshman 
on Board," Congressional  Quarterly. October 14, 1995. 
57. Shalit, Ruth   "Freshfellas," The New Republic. November 13, 
1995. 
58. Hager, George, "House Budget Panel To Extend Freeze," 
Congressional Quarterly. March 11, 1995. 
59. Ponnuru, Ramesh, "Mediacare," National Review. September 25, 
1995. 
60. Purdum, Todd, "A Washington Potboiler Steals Budget's 
Thunder," The Washington Post. November 17, 1995. 
79 
80 
INITIAL   DISTRIBUTION    LIST 
1. Defense Technical Information Center 2 
8725 John J. Kingman Road 
STE 0944 
Ft.   Belvoir,   Virginia  22060-6218 
2. Library, Code 13 2 
Naval Postgraduate School 
Monterey,   California  93943-5101 
3. Prof. Dick Doyle (Code SM/Dy)  „ . .1 
Naval Postgraduate School 
Monterey,   California   93943-5103 
4. CDR Louis Kalmar (Code SM/KI) 1 
Naval Postgraduate School 
Monterey,   California,   93943-5103 
5. LT Francis Molinari 1 
JAC Molesworth 
PSC 46, Box 362 
APO AE 09469 
81 
